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Deficit Projections vs. Deficit Forecasts
The outlook for the federal government budget
deficitoverthe remainderofthe decade has
received considerableattention inthepress, in the
most recent Presidential election campaign, and
in discussions ofappropriate economic policies.
The data forming the basis for these discussions
are usuallydeficitprojections similarto those
prepared each year bythe Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) andtheOfficeofManagement and
Budget (OMB).
Both ofthese agencies are required, underthe
terms ofthe Congressional Budget Actof1974, to
construct medium-term projections offederal
receipts, outlays and deficits. These projections
are constructed for the limited purpose ofprovid-
ing a benchmark against which proposals for
changes in federal outlays ortaxes can be com-
pared. The most recent projections ofthe federal
deficitfrom these agencies are presented in Chart
1. It is evidentfrom a quickglance that the two
agencies projectstrikingly different paths for the
deficit overthe remainder ofthe decade.
Neither agency constructs these projections as
forecasts offuture federal budget deficits, although
the estimates frequently are interpreted in that
fashion. The purposes ofthis Letter are to explain
the difference between a budget forecast and
budget projections, and to indicate why it is in-
appropriate to use the latter as forecasts.
Budget forecasts
In manydiscussionsofthemedium-term (next3to
5 years) economicoutlookorofproposed chang~s
in fiscal policy, theeconomicforecastemployed IS
based upon a forecast offederal receipts, outlays,
orthe budgetdeficit. For example, some analysts
assertthatinterestrates on long-term securities are
presently high because lenders are forecasting
large federal government budget deficits through
the remainder ofthe decade and thus anticipate
that the governmentwill have to finance them.
These analysts predictthatthis large future bor-
rowing bythe governmentwill drive up future
short-term interest rates.
Such statements implicitly are based upon afore-
cast offuture federal budgetdeficits, that is, the
best guess aboutthe size ofthe deficits thatwill
actuallyoccuratfuturedates given the information
availableatthetimethattheforecast is constructed.
Alternatively stated, the forecast offuture deficits
is the forecaster's judgment aboutthe most likely
values for deficits at future dates.
A true forecast ofgovernment receipts, outlays,
and the budgetdeficitcannot be constructed
independentlyofaforecast ofeconomic activity.
The forecaster must make assumptions aboutthe
most likelyfuture size ofgovernment programs,
future tax rates, future monetary policy and all
otherfactors that are believed to influence eco-
nomic activity. Based upon these assumptions,
budget deficits must be forecast simultaneously
with future economic activity.
There are two reasons that economic activity and
budget deficits must be forecast together. The first
is that federal outlays and receipts, and hence the
budgetdeficit, are affected bythe state ofthe
economy. Ifthe economy slides into a recession,
federal tax receipts decline even iftax rates stay
the same sincethetaxbase uponwhich those rates
are assessed, such as adjusted gross incomeor
corporate profits, declines. Similarly, in a reces-
sion, certain federal governmentoutlays, e.g.,
unemployment insurance and social service
payments, rise.
The impactofa recession on federal government
receipts and outlays is to increase the size ofthe
observed deficiteven though no explicitpolicy
actions have been taken bythe Congress orthe
President. Conversely, ifthe economyexpands
rapidly, and the rate of inflation increases, federal
receipts and outlays typically increase as the cost
of items purchased bythe government increases
and as inflation increasesthesize, in dollars,ofthe
base on which taxes are levied.
These induced effects ofthe economy on the
budgettend to cushion the economy's decline
when it is weak and restrain the economywhen it
is strong. Hence, the frequent reference to the
"automatic stabilizer" aspect offiscal policy.
The second reason forecasts ofthe economy and
the budgetcannotbedone independently is simplyFRBSF
that the interaction between federal receipts and
outlays and the economy is nota one-way street.
Decisions bythe Congress and the President to
alterthe amountofgovernment purchases orthe
rate or base for various taxes affect the level of
economic activity, at least in the short-run.
Budget forecasts vs. projections
The budget projections constructed bytheCBO
and the OMB are notforecasts as defined above.
Instead ofdetermining thefuture path oftheecon-
omy and the future budget deficit simultaneously
as required by a true forecast,these agencies
assume a path offuture economic activity and ask
the question: whatvalues wiII be realized forgov-
ernment outlays, receipts and the budget deficit if
the assumed path ofeconomic activity is to be
realized and ifgovernmentprograms and tax rates
are maintained at certain levels.
This technique does notguarantee consistency
between the projections ofeconomic activity and
the assumed fiscal and/or monetary policy. In the
wordsoftheCongressional BudgetOffice: "These
projections are notforecasts ofthe economy,
based on assumptions aboutthe maintenance of
currentpolicies. Attimes, the out-yearprojections
have been viewed as goals while at other times
they have incorporated average historical growth
rates."
The contrast between the projection approach
and atrueforecastoffuture deficitscan be seen in
Chart 2 which gives the economic assumptions
behind the CBO and OMB budget projections
prepared lastwinter. Both agencies are required to
make projections based on the same fiscal policy
assumptions. CBOassumes an economicenviron-
mentwith less growth, more inflation, and higher
market interest rates than the environment as-
sumed by OMB. These differences in the assump-
tionsaboutthe path oftheeconomywiththe same
policy settings are primarily responsible forthe
differences in the projections illustrated in Chart1.
In both cases, drasticallydifferent projections of
future deficits could be produced by small alter-
ations in the economic assumptions.
There is no basis for presuming that one set of
assumptions represents amore likelypath foreco-
nomic activity than another. Indeed, the assump-
tions underlyinghoth are suspect. The usual
assumption isofrelatively steady real growthover
a five-year horizon. However, this horizon en-
compasses the average span ofatypical peacetime
business cycle in the U.S. In otherwords, a 5-year
horizon often spans a period ofconsiderable fluc-
tuation in economic activity. Consequently, the
underlyingeconomic assumption ofsteady growth
is often likelytobe apoorforecastofthemedium-
term behaviorofthe economy. Because ofsuch
conditions, the budget projections are likelyto be
poor indicators ofactual future budgetdeficits.
Currentservice concepts
Another reason thatmedium-term budgetprojec-
tions are apt notto represent future budgetcon-
ditions is that they are typicallyconstructed on a
current services basis. Underthe current services
concept, future receipts and outlaysare calculated
underthe unlikely assumption thatthe current
laws and programs will remain unchanged.
Nondefense expenditures subject to the appropri-
ationsprocess are typicallyproj~ctedattheirfund-
ing levels in the most recently completed fiscal
year adjusted upward to keep pace with the pro-
jected rate ofinflation. Defenseexpenditures have
been treated differentlyatvarioustimes in the past
within the current services budget concept. In the
recentpast, the CBO has prepared projections of
defense expenditures based on the most r~cent
Congressional Budget resolution. This builds sub-
stantial inflation-adjusted growth(5-6 percentper
year) intothe currentprojectionsoffuture defense
spending, and, as a result, defense spending is
projected to average in the range of6.5 to 7.0
percent per year through 1990.
In contrast, OMB uses the Reagan administration's
policy proposals for defense as the basis for its
current services defense outlay projection. Under
this definition, currentservices outlaysfordefense
growafter adjustmentfor inflation as much as 10.6
percent in fiscal year 1986, butshow inflation-ad-justed growth decliningto slightlyover 5 percent
per year in 1989 and 1990. These differenttreat-
mentsofdefense spending result in aprojectionof
$18 billion more in current services defense out-
lays byOMB in fiscal year 1990than byCBO, even
though the OMB projections assume lowerfuture
inflation rates than the CBO.
theCBOand OMBare the resu Its ofaveryprecisely
defined exercise. The rules ofthis exercise were
constructed to provide a benchmark against which
proposals for changes in outlays ortaxes could be
compared. These measures are notdesigned as,
norshould they be interpreted as, forecasts of
future federal outlays, receipts, ordeficits.
Conclusions
The medium-term budgetprojectionsprepared by
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Loans, Leases and Investments' 2 191,879 274 11,175 6.1
Loans and Leases1 6 173,765 206 12,136 7.5
Commercial and Industrial 52,065 9 2,287 4.5
Real estate 63,303 157 2,870 4.7
Loans to Individuals 34,415 114 6,184 21.9
Leases 5,373 - 6 385 7.7
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,181 103 - 783 - 6.5
Other Securities2 6,933 - 35 - 178 - 2.5
Total Deposits 197,061 - 325 9,747 5.2
Demand Deposits 46,750 - 182 2,325 5.2
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 30,562 - 670 2,215 7.8
OtherTransaction Balances4 13,570 - 257 1,527 12.6
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,741 115 5,893 4.5
MoneyMarketDeposit
Accounts-Total 44,229 19 5,530 14.2
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 ormore 38,383 74 - 990 - 2.5
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 23,967 3,095 211 0.8
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency (- )
Borrowings











, Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and othersources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change